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John Smith’s settlement? The work of the 1992-1993  
Labour party - trade unions links review group 
 
Abstract 
In this article, I examine the work of the 1992-1993 Labour party trade union links review 
group. I ask whether the measures it proposed amounted to a new, durable settlement 
which governed internal relationships within the party. I detail disagreements amongst 
trade unions over the format that parliamentary selections should take; I evaluate the 
demands for reform of the party-union link; I ask whether support for reform and for OMOV 
was falling in the early 1990s; I consider whether unions launched a ‘no say no pay 
campaign’ with regard to the Labour party; I assess how much restraint was demonstrated 
at this time by Labour’s affiliated unions; and I consider what might have been at stake in 
these debates more generally. I conclude that there was considerable antagonism in party-
union relations during the early 1990s and that the work of the review group did not 
amount to an enduring settlement.  
 
Key words: Labour party, trade unions, modernisation, parliamentary selections, leadership 
elections 
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Introduction 
Scholars have given relatively little attention to the work of the 1992-1993 Labour party - 
trade union links review group (LPTULRG , 1992a and b)1. The paucity of discussion is 
surprising given the extensive newspaper coverage given to Labour’s 1993 party conference 
at which the review group’s work was discussed. Following the recommendations of the 
final report, that conference voted for the introduction of a form of one member, one vote 
(OMOV) for the selection of parliamentary candidates, and for the reform of the electoral 
college by which the party’s leader was elected so that trade unions took a reduced share 
and their members voted on an individual basis. Many press commentators concluded that 
these changes amounted to a fundamental reform of Labour’s structure, one achieved in 
the face of considerable opposition from leading trade union figures: it was, in short, a 
major triumph for the modernisers within the party. Writing in The Guardian, Hugo Young 
described it as ’a famous victory’, as ‘the party makes its way into the modern age’. He 
continued, ‘It marks the end of baronial domination of the Labour party’ (Young, 1993, 22). 
For the Independent, it was a ‘dramatic, close-run but decisive victory’ (MacIntyre and 
Clement, 1993, 1). According to The Scotsman, it was a ‘history victory to curb union power’ 
(Macaskill and Copley, 1993) with ‘far-reaching rule changes’ (Smith, 1993). These views 
were reinforced a year later at the time of Labour leader John Smith’s unexpected death. 
Subsequently, however, interest focused on Tony Blair’s New Labour project.  
 
Academic analyses of the review group have been somewhat at odds with such 
contemporary press opinion. These accounts tend to accept the difficult circumstances 
surrounding the working party’s proceedings and the acrimony that surrounded its 
deliberations. But they doubt the importance of its conclusions. Alderman and Carter 
argued ‘there were very few substantial constitutional changes’. Their immediate 
judgement was that the reforms passed at the 1993 Labour conference were ‘largely 
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cosmetic’ (Alderman and Carter, 1994, 332). Without addressing the substance of the 
changes, Paul Webb noted that ‘a somewhat bitter debate’ had come ‘nowhere near 
constituting party-union divorce’ (Webb, 1995, 1 and 2). In a measured analysis, Meg Russell 
concluded the review group’s proposals to be ‘relatively cautious’, suggesting that ‘the final 
package fell well short of what many had wanted’ (Russell, 2005, 30 and 56). Thomas Quinn 
suggested that the group was ‘dominated by traditionalists from the big unions’ (Quinn, 
2005, 68) though he goes on to suggest that the introduction of reforms did have some 
impact on the party’s structure. In the Nuffield election study, however, David Butler and 
Dennis Kavanagh draw a stronger conclusion about the new measures: ‘These steps 
effectively broke the power of the unions within the party’ (1997, 49). 
 
Recently, Lewis Minkin’s volume, The Blair Supremacy, provides a detailed narrative of the 
review group’s work (Minkin, 2014, 82-144). This contribution is especially valuable, not 
only because it is the most comprehensive scholarly account of the review group’s work, but 
also due to the fact that he was a member of the working party. Appointed to the review 
group at the start of its discussions, Minkin played a central part in shaping its deliberations 
through the production of a number of papers that fed directly into its final report. Like 
other scholars, Minkin disputes the outcome of the 1993 conference as representing a 
triumph for Labour’s modernisers. Unlike their accounts, he suggest that the debate was not 
especially rancorous or harsh. More fundamentally, he concludes that the new arrangement 
did amount to a revised settlement of the party’s structure (Minkin, 2014, 108).  
 
In this article, I look at work of the review group and its contribution to Labour-union 
relations. My central aims are to evaluate the debate within and around the working party 
and to assess how substantive was the solution reached at the 1993 conference. I ask what 
was at stake in the debate: did discussion over OMOV mask a more fundamental dispute 
within the party? I assess whether the review group led to a new settlement, in some form 
or other, of the party-union relationship? I define a settlement as a stable and durable set of 
arrangements which most significant Labour actors accepted as being legitimate and 
enduring. Finally, I consider what this episode tells us about John Smith’s leadership of the 
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party. In discussing these issues, I draw on the existing academic literature, but I make 
particular use of Minkin’s account as a framework for my analysis. As a participant and as 
scholar with a reputation for meticulous analysis, Minkin’s analysis provides a starting point 
for my evaluation of the review group and Labour union relations more generally. I draw on 
a plethora of other sources including the archival papers of the review group and of 
Labour’s National Executive Committee as well as material in Tribune and trade union 
publications. All of these have been largely neglected in the existing work (even to an extent 
in Minkin’s characteristically forensic analysis). Tribune is especially useful as a 
counterweight to press coverage: it was a leftwing newspaper that was unaligned in the 
debate and took a variety of positions on issues as they came up. So Tribune is not open to 
the same sort of charge of media interference that might be made against other journalistic 
sources. Accordingly it throws interesting light on the state of Labour politics. 
 
I start with a narrative account of the review group’s work before providing a summary of 
Minkin’s key analytical points. (Minkin’s narrative is packed with subtlety: I do my best to do 
justice to the complexity of his account.) The following sections take a more analytical 
perspective discussing in turn a number of issues raised about the working party’s 
deliberations. I address the disagreements amongst trade unionists on the review group and 
the substance of their discussion about parliamentary selections; the nature of demands for 
the reform of the party-union link; whether support for OMOV declined within the party 
during the early 1990s; whether there was a ‘no say no pay’ campaign by the trade unions; 
and how much restraint was exercised by the trade unions during the debate. I go on to 
assess what was at stake in the debate. Finally, I conclude briefly by assessing the nature of 
the settlement agreed in 1993 and what light this episode throws on John Smith’s 
leadership of the party. 
 
 
The work of the review group 
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Throughout the party’s history, Labour’s relations with its affiliated unions have, of course, 
often been difficult with numerous points of tension and disagreement. In the 1960s and 
1970s, then into the 1980s, frictions mounted over such matters as aspects of economic 
strategy (for example incomes policy or public spending), as well as broader strategic 
concerns and organisational issues (see Daniels and McIlroy, 2010; and Minkin, 1991). In 
April 1992, Labour’s fourth general election defeat in a row heightened tensions further as 
the party sought to understand its poor electoral performance. So-called “modernisers” 
within the party drew a straightforward conclusion, blaming Labour’s intimate association 
with the unions for the reversal at the polls (Gould, 2011). Whether matters were quite so 
straightforward is less clear. Dianne Hayter – writing in part to rebut Phillip Gould’s account 
- suggested that trade unions had played an important part in steadying Labour during the 
1980s and advancing some of the reforms that modernisers proposed. Minkin too 
emphasised the role played by unions as ballast within the party, helping to stabilise it. 
 
It was in this context that, In April 1992, in a Tribune article, Tom Sawyer, deputy general 
secretary sectary of the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) and a member of 
Labour’s NEC, mapped out an agenda for discussing the party’s link with its affiliated unions 
(Sawyer, 1992a). He wrote to Larry Whitty, Labour’s General Secretary, asking that the issue 
might be discussed so that the relationship was dealt with in a ‘considered and constructive 
way’ (Sawyer, 1992b). The suggestion came, of course, in the aftermath of an unexpected 
general election defeat which had focused debate in part about the structure of the party 
and the role of the trade unions. Writing a little later in Fabian Review, Sawyer defended the 
link but called for a ‘new settlement’ (Sawyer, 1992c, 4). In May, the NEC charged Whitty 
with coming up with a concrete proposal (NEC minutes, 27 May 1992, 6-7). He followed this 
up with a brief paper for the June meeting, proposing ‘an authoritative Review Group to 
look at all aspects of the relationship’, (Whitty, 1992). The NEC decided to go ahead (NEC 
minutes, 24 June 1992, 6). Whitty proposed that the committee’s membership was made up 
largely of trade unionists and parliamentarians. They were joined by Larry Whitty as 
secretary and Joyce Gould, a party official, as well as Lewis Minkin. Two nominated 
members, Bill Morris and John Edmonds, general secretaries of the Transport and General 
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Workers’ Union (TGWU) and the GMB respectively, immediately stood down and asked that 
Margaret Prosser and Tom Burlison took their places (NEC minutes. 22 July 1992). 
 
There were, manifestly, significant issues to be discussed. The system of parliamentary 
selection in operation – locally based electoral colleges made up of individual members 
alongside affiliated trade unions - was operationally difficult to manage: in 1991, without 
finding an alternative, the party conference had voted to abolish it. There was 
dissatisfaction about the operation of the electoral college to choose the party leader in 
which union votes were cast as monolithic blocks for one candidate (Cook, 1992). In some 
unions, there was little consultation of members as to whom the block should be allocated. 
Interventions by union leaders in the party’s 1992 leadership election where some had 
rushed to back John Smith’s candidacy reinforced such concerns (Wickham-Jones, 2014, 37). 
For some modernisers within the party, there was a more controversial claim that the 
unions (and Labour’s link with them) were an impediment, by definition, to electoral victory 
(see the on-going account in Gould, 2011, for example, 119 and 172). In any case, Whitty 
mapped out a wide remit for the new group.  
 
Rather at odds with the task allocated to the review group, on the issue of parliamentary 
selection, outgoing party leader Neil Kinnock gave Labour a firm steer towards the 
introduction of one member one vote (Kinnock, 1992). The same NEC meeting in May that 
discussed Sawyer’s letter endorsed a proposal from him for OMOV for candidate selection 
(Foss, 1992, 3). Kinnock’s memorandum was blunt and clear. The party had agreed to 
reform parliamentary selections but widening the franchise to include trade union levy 
payers alongside individual members in some form would, he argued, be unnecessarily 
expensive and procedurally difficult. Some constituencies might be swamped by affiliated 
participants (possibly over 10,000). Legal challenges would be likely. Some unionists who did 
not support the party would be able to take part. Accordingly, it was better that unions 
should retain a role in some other way. Kinnock wanted Labour to move immediately to a 
straightforward OMOV of party members. The former Labour leader had long campaigned 
for the shift (Westlake, 2001, 273-5). Space precludes a full discussion here but an undated 
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office memo mapped out much the same terrain as his 1992 paper. Alongside the issue of 
cost, it criticised the involvement of levy payers on the grounds that they would swamp 
individual party members and might be supporters of other parties. It would be very 
expensive: ‘Every trade union would have to guarantee the reliability of their systems – this 
has not been the case in their own elections’ (Note on the levy payers participating in 
OMOV in reselections’, no date). 
 
In June, the NEC handed parliamentary selections back to the working party (NEC minutes, 
24 June 1992, 6; Westlake, 2001, 612). The party conference in September then voted for 
the NEC report which indicated its support for OMOV while allowing the review group to 
proceed (NEC report, 1992, 40). At the same time, however, the conference also voted 
against NEC advice and passed a motion that supported continued trade union participation 
at all stages of parliamentary selection (NEC minutes 27 September 1992, 8). At this stage, 
Tribune reported that the review group was working – against the Kinnock memorandum - 
towards a version of OMOV where union levy payers were enfranchised (Tribune reporter, 
1992, 3). In November 1992, an internal memorandum, RG49, mapped out a draft report for 
the committee. It proposed combining individual votes with collective representation 
through the establishment of a register of party supporters of the party that would be 
drawn up from the affiliated organisations (RG49, no date, 6). The draft recommended that 
for parliamentary selections an electoral college would include these registered supporters 
(RG49, no date, 13). 
 
Following the party conference, however, a shift took place in the review group. Bryan 
Gould was defeated in elections to the NEC and his place on the review group was taken by 
Tony Blair. In a sense the choice of Blair was straightforward. The replacement needed to 
come from the PLP. Robin Cook and John Prescott were already members of the working 
party. New to the NEC, having stood down for a few months when Smith was elected to 
replace him, Neil Kinnock might have been an unusual choice as an ex-leader with a clear 
position on many of the issues. Tony Benn was now rather isolated on the left of the party 
(Dennis Skinner had lost his seat). That left a choice from Gordon Brown (newly elected with 
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Blair and focused on economic issues), David Blunkett (who was associated with Bryan 
Gould, having managed his election campaign for the leadership) and Blair. Of course, it may 
be that John Smith also wanted a modernising voice to counter the arguments deployed by 
trade unionists. Clearly identified as a leading reformer within the party, Tony Blair took a 
tougher line on the introduction of new measures such as OMOV (Rentoul, 1995, 320-322). 
At the October meeting of the review group, a lengthy discussion ensued over 
parliamentary selections at which it was agreed that OMOV would be discussed in the 
report although the supporters’ register would remain as the trade unions’ preferred option 
(minutes, 30 October 1992, 1-2). At the same time, a number of options would be mapped 
out for leadership elections. The following month, the working party came to discuss the 
possibility, developed by Tom Burlison of the GMB, that trade union levy payers should 
participate in future selections as registered supporters. Along with Nigel Harris of the 
AEEU, Blair was extremely critical of the proposal, suggesting it would create two classes of 
members and was, in any case, unworkable (Anderson, 1992, 6) Writing in The Guardian, 
Patrick Wintour suggested that Burlison’s scheme for levy payers lacked support from his 
own union’s northern region (which wanted them to become full members) (Wintour, 
1992a, 2). A GMB source complained to Tribune about the article: ‘What’s happening here is 
that the OMOV people are trying to bounce Smith’ (Osler, 1992a, 3). A couple of weeks 
later, a Tribune leader noted that the issue risked ‘a spectacular bout of internal feuding’ 
(Tribune, 1992a, 2). By January, it was clear that the committee, effectively log-jammed, 
could not reach an immediate agreement. Some members of the group questioned whether 
any form of report might be produced (‘Resume of progress’, no date, 1). Tribune reported 
that it was ‘deadlocked’ between the registered supporters scheme and OMOV (Osler, 
1993a, 10). Subsequently, the paper indicated that the group would simply map out 
different options for candidate selection as well as leadership elections so a final decision 
could be taken later. (Osler, 1993b, 3.) In February, Labour’s NEC agreed to issue an interim 
report in this format along with a questionnaire to elicit party opinion.  
 
At this stage, John Smith mapped out his preferences: he wanted a redefined electoral 
college made up in equal shares of the PLP and individual party members to elect the 
leader, a reduced union vote at conference with ballots cast individually, and OMOV for 
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parliamentary selection though in the future registered supporters might be involved (NEC 
minutes, 24 February 1993, 8; Stuart, 2005, 326-7). He expressed ‘his wish to ditch any 
union role in internal elections’ (Osler, 1993c, 3). Further support for OMOV came from a 
variety of sources within the party including Kinnock, former deputy leader Roy Hattersley, 
the Fabians and the Labour Coordinating Commitee. Describing the interim report as ‘long 
and turgid’, John Spellar, one Labour MP and a strong supporter of OMOV, argued that 
registered supporters scheme was ‘politically undesirable and administratively impractical’ 
(Spellar, 1993, 6; Hayter, 2005, 41).  
 
Many senior trade union leaders, however, appeared to be implacably hostile towards 
OMOV. In the past, John Edmonds of the GMB had been critical of the block vote and 
supportive of OMOV: The Guardian quoted him as describing the existing format of the 
electoral college as ‘a nonsense’ (Wintour and Milne, 1992, 2). In the late 1980s, he had 
mapped out a modernising agenda, directly criticising the block vote. He told the 1989 party 
conference ‘We [trade unions] must surrender control. The trade unions should step aside. 
Many new members must be recruited and these individual party members must be given a 
new responsibility, because whenever possible we should make our decisions by one 
member, one vote. The changes must be radical’ (LPACR, 1989, 139). In the summer of 
1992, Patrick Wintour reported that Smith had been assured that Edmonds was committed 
to reform of the union link (Wintour, 1992b, 21). But by then Edmonds appears, in my view, 
to have reoriented his views and backpedalled. Of course, Wintour’s claim may have 
reflected wishful thinking or deliberate spinning in the Smith office. Edmonds’ arms may 
have been tied by the position taken internally by the GMB (Timmins, 1992, 9). At any rate, 
Edmonds now opposed taking trade unionists out of Labour’s internal elections. He argued, 
‘By all means one person, one vote, but let’s make sure that that voting procedure includes 
everybody who is in the party, including those trade unionists’, continuing, ‘It would be 
totally undemocratic to deprive them all of their say’ (BBC, 1993a, 2 and 3).  
 
Smith indicated that he was prepared to compromise on the electoral college and, to a 
lesser extent, on parliamentary selection. On 19 May, he issued a press statement 
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supporting the notion that levy payers could join the party at a reduced rate and so 
participate in selection (Labour party press release, 19 May 1993, NEC papers). At the May 
NEC, he called for levy payers to be given cut price membership: he was subsequently 
criticised for pushing the proposal through without wider consultation (Osler, 1993e, 3). He 
accepted that unionists could retain a role in the electoral college to elect the party’s leader. 
John Prescott, an MP and frontbencher closely associated with the affiliates, argued in 
Tribune for this kind of levy plus arrangement: affiliated members could pay a small 
supplement to take a full part in parliamentary selections (Prescott, 1993, 2). Tom Sawyer 
described the idea as helpful (Sawyer, 1993, 1). But he repeated support for the 
establishment of a register of union based supporters. Some senior trade union leaders 
rejected Smith’s compromise, claiming that it was contradictory: why should trade unionists 
have a role in electing the leader but not selecting parliamentary candidates? Tribune 
quoted Bill Morris: ‘I don’t see how you can compromise on democracy’, though he 
continued ‘there is always room for dialogue (Osler, 1993f, 5) He insisted the unions 
‘exercise collection participation’ in the party, a move interpreted as supporting the status 
quo (quoted by Milne, 1993a, 6). Edmonds seemed equally uninterested in compromise: ‘If 
you are going to give individual trade union members who are affiliated members of the 
party a say in the leadership, then surely they should have a say in the selection of local 
candidates who stand on their behalf’ (BBC, 1993a, 3-4). In The Guardian, he argued that 
OMOV disenfranchised affiliates: ‘if trade unionists can vote in a national electoral college 
to elect their leader, why should they not be allowed to vote in a local electoral college to 
select their parliamentary candidate?’ (Edmonds, 1993a, 18). 
  
Through the summer of 1993, trade union conferences rejected OMOV, including some 
normally regarded as Labour loyalists. In April, USDAW snubbed general secretary Garfield 
Davies’s advice and voted narrowly against OMOV (USDAW Today, 1993, 10; Tribune, 
1993a, 1). UCW and MSF followed the shop workers’ union (Branch Officials’ Bulletin UCW, 
1993 para 501; Osler, 1993g, 3). In turn, GMB, NUPE and NCU rejected OMOV: Tribune 
described the proposal as ‘dead in the water’, a phrase attributed to Bill Morris by Sunday 
Times journalists (Osler, 1993h, 3; Grice and Prescott, 1993; see also Harper, 1993a, 4). 
Unsurprisingly, the TGWU voted against it in July. By contrast support for OMOV came in an 
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open letter to each Constituency Labour Party (CLP) from leading parliamentarians and 
members of the NEC Tony Blair, David Blunkett, Gordon Brown, Robin Cook and Neil 
Kinnock (Milne and White, 1993, 1). 
 
In July, Smith secured support for his compromise package from the review group in its final 
report (Osler, 1993i, 3). On 19 July, the NEC voted by 20 to 7 to back Smith. A number of 
trade union members supported Smith, some of them against their union mandate (NEC 
minutes, 19 July 1993, 4). Despite such support for this compromise and notwithstanding an 
accommodating speech (in policy terms) at the Trades Union Congress in September, it 
appeared likely – given union opposition - that Smith would suffer a humiliating defeat 
when the issue was voted upon at the party conference. There was some shift toward 
Smith: Garfield Davies indicated that USDAW would ignore its conference decision and back 
OMOV (Osler, 1993j, 1). NUPE decided to back a vaguely worded motion which effectively 
meant support for Smith (Harper and White, 1993, 1). But other unions remained opposed.  
 
In the event, the Labour conference voted for OMOV by the tightest of margins (Hagerty, 
1993, 1). It also backed reform to the leadership electoral college. The pattern of voting was 
complex. The TGWU and the GMB had sustained their opposition. But in the event, as well 
as the AEEU, NUPE and USDAW, a number of other unions had come round to back Smith 
including COHSE, UCW and RMT (Wintour and Harper, 1993a, 1).   
 
Lewis Minkin and the review group 
In his account of Labour politics during the 1990s, Lewis Minkin repeatedly emphasises the 
importance of the norms, unwritten rules, and protocols that he suggests have guided the 
behaviour of key actors across the party and its affiliated unions (see also Minkin, 1991, 26; 
Wickham-Jones, 2015). In particular, Minkin makes much of an overriding norm of ‘restraint’ 
which shaped trade union attitudes in the review group’s discussions, just as it has done 
more generally over previous decades. He argues that it is effectively the defining 
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characteristic guiding trade union behaviour: it is ‘the most significant feature’ of the 
informal rules that shape conduct within the labour movement (Minkin, 2014, 13). Such 
restraint on the part of unions ensured loyalty towards and solidarity with the Parliamentary 
Labour Party: Trade union leaders would be sensitive about how they might approach 
issues. At other times, however, Minkin’s approach appears to put less emphasis on norms 
and more upon a rationally-oriented cost-benefit analysis: ‘It [the link] has survived because 
of a common heritage and shared values, but it has survived mainly because its usefulness 
far outweighed its costs and disappointments’ (Minkin, 1992a; Minkin, 1992c, Minkin, 
1992e). 
 
Within this framework, Minkin highlights a number of specific aspects of the review group’s 
work. He argues that, for the most part, trade union participants approached the work of 
the review group in an open-minded manner (Minkin, 2014, 86). Indeed, he suggests that 
trade unionists accepted the need for a reform of the party-union link: they wanted some 
sort of dialogue about how to go about it. They acknowledged that there were issues with 
the operation of the block vote, the process by which union votes were cast as a single 
entity at the party conference, and they quickly accepted that the unions should no longer 
have a majority of votes at it, agreeing to a reduction in their share from 90 to 70 per cent 
with a planned further cut to 50 per cent. It is a mistake in this regard, Minkin suggests, to 
view the debate as one between obstructive trade unionists and forward minded 
modernisers. Whatever they might have said publicly, there were ‘repetitive signals’ from 
the modernisers that the link should be broken in some fundamental manner: ‘the 
separatist aim had been privately clarified’ (Minkin, 2014, 83). Modernisers did not consider 
the wider issues involved: they addressed neither the benefits that Labour derived from its 
relationship with the trade unions nor the difficulties that ending that link would create. 
 
Despite this broad consensus, Minkin emphases just how divided the trade unions were 
amongst themselves over the exact form that reforms might take. Different unions took 
varied positions across the issues under consideration (Minkin, 2014, 90-91). In terms of 
parliamentary selection, effectively the crux of the review group’s work, the GMB had 
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originally backed OMOV but then shifted over towards some form of a registered 
supporters’ scheme. NUPE also favoured the development of registered supporters albeit in 
a different format. Other trade unionists were critical of such an arrangement. Bill Morris 
felt affiliated members should be included simply by virtue of paying the levy. Minkin 
concludes, ‘The opposition to OMOV in the unions never came up with a united alternative 
platform’ (Minkin, 2014, 96). When they (representatives from GMB, TGWU, NUPE, MSF, 
UCW and RMT) met in May 1993, they were unable to reach agreement over parliamentary 
selection (Osler, 1993d, 3; Milne, Wintour and Knewstub, 1993, 6). The AEEU (Amalgamated 
Engineering and Electrical Union) meanwhile backed OMOV enthusiastically.  
 
Consistent with the norms he has outlined, Minkin is at pains to suggest that, contrary to 
press reports, there was no financial pressure put on the party during the work of the 
review group. He claims that the notion of a ‘no say, no pay’ campaign by which the unions 
demanded influence in exchange for their continued monetary contributions was without 
foundation. There was, he accepts, a single ‘clumsy’ briefing in June 1992 on the subject by 
Sawyer (Minkin, 2014, 95). But union figures acted with characteristic self-control in making 
no demands and offering no warnings on the issue. The reduction by unions of the number 
of affiliated members (accompanied by a reduced aggregate affiliation payment) simply 
reflected a general decline in union membership (Minkin, 2014, 108). 
 
Attitudes within Labour were shifting. Minkin suggests that by 1993 there was less support 
for OMOV amongst the CLPs than in the past (Minkin, 2014, 93). In a 1990 consultation it 
had been 87 per cent. By 1993, party soundings generated backing from only 35 per cent 
(with 15 per cent opting for the levy plus variant). The implication of this point is that there 
was less grassroots pressure for a dramatic overhaul of the party’s structure. 
 
The situation surrounding the 1992-93 debate over Labour’s trade union links was made 
more difficult throughout by deteriorating personal relations between John Smith and John 
Edmonds (Stuart, 2005, 332). Smith found Edmonds’ behaviour very difficult and unhelpful. 
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Concluding that the modernisers were pushing the reform agenda far too far, Edmonds 
refused to compromise on constitutional issues. Despite such difficulties, Minkin suggests, 
the unions continued to exercise self-control. They did not push on issues as their position 
might have allowed them to do and as their views might have suggested they would. When, 
at the GMB Congress in 1993, Edmonds directly criticised the leadership of the PLP, many 
were astonished at how tough he was and at how far the norm of restraint had been 
eroded. Writing in The Guardian, Edmonds warned that ‘Even GMB loyalty has its limits’ 
(Edmonds, 1993a, 18). For Minkin, the issue had ‘stretched this restraint to its limits’ 
(Minkin, 2014, 94). Defending union interests had effectively become paramount in a 
struggle against modernisers. (Smith’s direct involvement, according to Minkin, helped 
some trade unionists to reassess their position, partly out of loyalty to the Labour leader, 
despite their mandated position - 2014, 98). 
 
Despite Smith’s compromise and his interventions, defeat still looked certain for the Labour 
leader given the number of unions mandated to oppose the reforms that he had backed 
(Minkin, 2014, 98-102). In the event, however, the drafting of the relevant NEC rule change 
was carefully structured to include OMOV alongside a commitment to all women shortlists 
(AWS) (see also Kettle, 1993, 21). Such wording put some unions in a dilemma given that 
they backed AWS but opposed OMOV. An ambiguous motion from the RMT and NUPE 
referred to levy plus and union participation in an unclear manner. Party officials and 
supportive MPs went out, apparently for the first time in such circumstances, to intervene in 
the argument, lobbying for support for the leader’s position (see also Clement and Wynn 
Davies, 1993). Anthony Bevins and Andy McSmith predated this initiative back to the 
summer, targeting ‘the unmandated, the weak and the vulnerable’ among the constituency 
delegates (Bevins and McSmith, 1993, 6). John Prescott gave an emotional speech 
demanding support for Smith but some unions had already been won over (the risk of Smith 
resigning as leader if defeated – at the very least the likelihood of a major constitutional 
impasse in the party – played a part in such deliberations). One of the largest affiliates, 
Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF), decided to abstain. Having gone to the brink of 
an extremely damaging crisis, the rule change proposing OMOV was passed by a narrow 
majority of 47.509 per cent to 44.388.  
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The thrust of Minkin’s account challenges the notion that the work of the review group and 
the votes at the 1993 Labour conference were an unambiguous victory for the modernisers 
within the party; ‘It was in effect a huge rebuff’ (Minkin, 2014, 108). Modernisers had 
hoped, he claims, to end the party’s link with the unions but in the event the working party 
had reaffirmed its importance to Labour politics. The 1993 conference had rejected a 
motion supporting pure OMOV and backed one from the TGWU calling for an electoral 
college for parliamentary selections. The vote on the rule change simply took precedence 
over the TGWU backed motion. Trade unionists had agreed that the affiliated organisations’ 
share of conference votes would come down to 50 per cent – the unions would no longer 
have a majority (Minkin, 2014, 103). The block vote was to be recast to the extent that each 
delegate would receive a voting card for the conference. In terms of hand votes, this form of 
representation was very favourable to CLP delegates who were numerically dominant.  
 
Towards the end of 1992, Tony Manwaring, a party official working with the review group, 
explicitly attempted to draft ‘protocol’ for a ‘new settlement between the party and 
affiliated unions’ (Manwaring, 1992). In effect, Minkin suggests that the review group 
succeeded in mapping out such an arrangement. It was ‘an impressive collective 
achievement’: Labour had reworked its organisational structures and agreed a new 
settlement with the trade unions (Minkin, 2014, 106).  
 
There is much to be commended in Minkin’s analysis of the work of the review group, not 
least, of course, the depth of his empirical material. Indeed, the account in The Blair 
Supremacy, if anything, understates his role. His input to the discussion was of considerable 
importance, offering a number of papers directly to the review group which, while detailing 
areas where it might be reformed, outlined the benefits to Labour of a close institutional 
link to the trade unions. In normative terms, making a strong case in favour of the 
relationship, Minkin effectively took on an unstated role as the main theorist of the review 
group (Minkin, 1992b). He placed a particular emphasis the unions’ role as ballast, stating, 
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for example, that ‘the activity of groups used to thinking in terms of unity gives important 
ballast in times of stress and crisis’ (Minkin, 1992c, 2; Minkin, no date, 2). Both the interim 
and final reports of the review group went on to make much the same point, noting the 
importance of the trade union contribution to the party in terms of ‘realism and stability’ 
without which ‘the Labour party would doubtless have torn itself apart on a number of 
different occasions’ (LPTULRG, 1992a, 7 and 1992b, 3). Minkin told one meeting, ‘We have 
to attempt to secure a new settlement’ (Minkin, 1992a, 4). In effect he mapped out the 
‘new settlement’, based on formal and ‘new unwritten rules’, that came to form the basis 
for the group’s proposals (Minkin, 1992b, 8). 
 
As well as offering a clear commitment to reform and a defence of the relationship, Minkin 
went on went on to outline his argument in a number of trade union publications as well as 
occasional interviews and even less frequently meetings (see, for example, Minkin, 1992a, 
1992c). He emphasised the representative role of the unions through the base they afforded 
the party in the working class and in the work place. The link also offered financial resources 
to the party, and a means to communicate with the electorate.  In the next section I begin 
my analysis of the review group’s work by assessing the arguments within it regarding 
parliamentary selections. 
 
The depth of disagreement on the review group: problems with a supporters’ register 
Concluding a registered supporters’ scheme to be too expensive, the TGWU wanted to 
maintain trade union branch participation along the lines of the existing electoral college 
(Whitty, 1993; Prosser, 1992). By contrast, the GMB and NUPE proposed – differing - 
arrangements to allow registered affiliates to take part. Tribune noted the group’s ‘paralysis’ 
(Osler, 1993b, 3). More importantly, as the review group edged towards such a scheme, the 
proposal attracted a barrage of criticisms (see, for example, RG42, no date; ‘Resume of 
Progress’, no date; ‘Memorandum on Selection and Reselection’, no date; and RG33, no 
date). Questions included: how would supporters be identified? Which constituency would 
they be allocated to? How would the scheme be kept up to date? How long would it take to 
 17 
 
get it up and running? Who would be responsible for it and for its practical 
operationalisation? How much would it cost? How would it prevent double voting 
(individual party members getting another vote as an affiliate)? What would the 
consequences be if a union opted out of the arrangement? Would such an arrangement 
undermine the incentive to join as a full member? Would it lead to two classes of members? 
Should registered supporters get a weighted vote (a fraction of that of a full member)? 
Would such a scheme be in breach of data protection laws? Would registered members be 
subject to the same rule of a 12 month period as were individual members? Would 
members of other parties get a vote? On the latter point, the Tribune group of MPs 
concluded, ‘We take the view that only Labour Party members should be allowed to 
participate’ (Tribune Group of MPs, 1993). A register might open the system up to external 
manipulation and to legal challenges. One memorandum commented that a universal 
system would be ‘unnecessarily bureaucratic’ and ‘involve considerable expense’ (‘Union 
participation in selection’, no date, 2). Another concluded that in some situations, ‘the 
propensity for abuse in such circumstances is legion and well-documented’ (‘Parliamentary 
Selections and Party-Union Links’, no date). The Tribune group suggested that ‘It would also 
allow undue influence to be exerted by outside groups with a separate political agenda to 
ours’ (Tribune group of MPs, 1993). One paper noted a likely male bias in a registered 
supporters’ scheme: ‘The selectorate is less likely to support women candidates, unless they 
have the support of the relevant trade union’ (RG42, no date, 6). 
 
Discussing Tom Burlison’s registered supporters’ scheme in a submission to the review 
group, Mark Walker, at the RMT (National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport workers), 
insisted that it was ‘actually immensely complicated’ (Walker, 1992, 1). He indicated that 
other parties would participate; it would be open to manipulation; and levy payers could 
swamp party members (in response to which levy payers might be given a fraction of a vote 
but, in turn, that would undermine the basis of OMOV). If they selected which 
constituencies to get involved in, unions would look to be driven by particular interests and 
to have ignored their members elsewhere. He argued that, ‘This system will not be seen as 
fair because it will not achieve the objective of “One (Labour Party) Member, One Vote” ’ 
(Walker, 1992, 2). Ordinary members would want something to distinguish themselves from 
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levy payers but this would make levy payers second class citizens effectively. Some unions 
were concerned about contacting levy payers at all fearing that it would lead to an increase 
in contracting out: drawing attention to their contribution might increase opt outs. John 
Williams of the TGWU put it bluntly: ‘Writing to all our political levy payers… could be the 
kiss of death for the political levy’ (Williams, 1992; see also Christopher, 1992). 
 
Minkin notes the lack of consensus amongst trade unionists. Though there was some 
support for continuing with the electoral college for parliamentary selections as a stop gap 
measure (LPTULRG, 1992b, 15), there was no agreement as to what might replace it in the 
longer term. What is clear from the archival papers and memoranda is just how critical was 
the response generated by the proposed registered supporters’ scheme. Interestingly, far 
more criticisms were made of the register than of OMOV. To be sure, participants in wider 
discussions disliked OMOV for watering down union involvement in the party’s affairs.  But 
those responsible for developing practical proposals raised a plethora of unfavourable 
points about the main alternative possibility. Minkin argues that, the failure to reach 
agreement notwithstanding, there was an understanding that reform was necessary: the 
debate, however, indicates a profound hostility in principled and practical terms towards 
the register. OMOV received far less critical attention. 
 
The demands for reform 
The pressure for reform of Labour’s link with its affiliates was directly related to trade union 
behaviour. In this respect, Minkin’s analysis may underestimate the pressure for reform 
within the wider labour movement. Numerous press reports identified issues over the 
conduct of trade union leaders during the 1992 Labour leadership contest (Alderman and 
Carter, 1994, 322-323; Wickham-Jones, 2014, 37-38; Minkin touches briefly on this issue, 
see 2014, 82). The actions of trade union leaders in pre-emptively endorsing Smith’s 
candidacy shaped the wider debate. The leftwing MP, Clare Short complained about ‘trade 
union leaders slipping back into bad habits’ as Edmonds offered support to John Smith 
‘before he even had time to telephone members of his union’s executive’ (Short, 1992, 3). A 
 19 
 
commentator in Fabian Review noted, ‘The appearance of union leaders on television within 
days of the result was blatant in its assertion of power’ (Dewdney, 1992, 4).  
 
The pages of Tribune in the months after the April 1992 general election suggest widespread 
support for institutional reform throughout Labour. A leader stated bluntly: ‘Labour needs 
radically to democratise its own structures. One member one vote for all major decisions 
and elections is essential and urgent’ (Tribune, 1992b 2). While he went on to defend the 
link, Ben Webb opened an article by saying ‘finding anyone who will defend the current 
arrangement between the trade unions and the Labour party… is a little like searching for 
principled advocates of the established church’ (Webb, 1992, 4). But Barry Sherman, a 
former trade union official, suggested that, from the point of view of organised labour, the 
formal link should be ended (Sherman, 1992). Chris Mullin, a former editor of the 
newspaper, stated uncompromisingly that the case for OMOV was ‘unanswerable’ given the 
‘sheer corruption’ in the ‘disposition of the trade union in a safe seat’ (Mullin, 1992, 4). 
 
Commentators had long identified the trade union block vote as a problematic feature of 
Labour’s structure. By the early 1990s, it was not just broadsheet newspapers and those 
firmly located within the modernisers’ wing of the party who were critical. Over 70 per cent 
of respondents in the University of Sheffield survey of party members thought that it 
brought ‘the party into disrepute’ (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, 240). A Tribune leader 
complained that insufficient progress had been made in getting rid of it: ‘its sheer weight 
which has meant for years now that a handful of union leaders have had the ability to 
determine party policy regardless of what anyone else thinks’ (Tribune, 1992c, 2). It 
concluded bluntly, ‘It is the block vote itself which is the problem: it is an essentially 
undemocratic institution’. Mullin was equally critical, describing it as the ‘greatest obstacle 
to Labour’s credibility as a modern democratic party’ (Mullin, 1992, 4). Even supporters such 
as the journalist, Geoffrey Goodman were unfavourable. In a critique of OMOV, he accepted 
‘It [block vote] has frequently been used as the instrument of power by the small and 
powerful elite which controls the most influential unions’ (Goodman, 1993, 5). One MORI 
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poll indicated that only 7 per cent of Labour inclined trade unionists wanted to retain it  
(Kellner, 1993). 
 
Minkin’s position on the issue was ambiguous. In a paper published by the UCW, Minkin 
defended the block vote, arguing, ‘It is prevalent in federal systems. The World Bank uses it 
as do shareholders at company meeting meetings – this is rarely criticised’ (Minkin, 1992c). 
John Prescott backed the block vote on similar grounds, claiming it could be democratic: 
‘after all, it is the mechanism by which votes are often cast at annual shareholders’ meetings 
and in pension trusts’ (Prescott, 1993 2). Elsewhere, though, Minkin defended Labour’s link 
with the unions rather than the block vote in its practical operation: ‘an argument against 
this [block vote] is not an argument against union ties per se’ (Minkin, 1992d, 1). He argued 
that, for internal elections, ‘The time has come to review these arrangements’ (Minkin, 
1992f, 1). Delegate democracy, however, should continue at conference. He acknowledged 
the survey evidence noted above, continuing that ‘the form of trade union voting at party 
conference with ever larger unions voting still as blocks, with no registration of minorities, 
looks more and more inexplicable, more and more unacceptable’ (Minkin, 1992a, 5; Minkin, 
1992b, 6). Moreover union mergers made the block vote increasingly problematic: ‘the 
possibility of a fairly permanent new settlement could be undermined when the next big 
amalgamation takes place’ (Minkin, 1992g, 8). Minkin focused on a proposal that the trade 
union share of votes at conference should come down to 50 per cent.   
 
In effect, Minkin’s defence of the link did not extend to the block vote (Minkin, 1992d, 13). 
Of course, any parallels with the framework of either the World Bank or of company 
structures offered in support of such arrangement were weak as block votes in these cases 
were indicative of ownership and direct control. In effect, they were evidence of exactly the 
kind of relationship that Labour wanted to move away from. 
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Support for OMOV within the Labour party during the early 1990s 
A 1990 party survey indicated that 87 per cent of CLPs favoured OMOV (NEC, 1990, 4). 
Three years later, a subsequent consultation reported that the figure had fallen to 35 per 
cent, evidence, Minkin claims, of falling support for reforms (LPTULRG, 1992b, 15). In similar 
vein, Tribune reported a BBC poll in which over half the responding constituency parties 
wanted unions to remain directly involved in candidate selection (Tribune, 1993b,3). 93 out 
of 180 CLPs supported union participation, with 82 favouring OMOV. Critics pointed out 
such a survey was, effectively, of constituency secretaries and not of party members. 
Tribune detailed another poll organised by the frontbench MP Robin Cook which indicated 
74 per cent of trade unionists supported OMOV with only 6 per cent against (Osler, 1993k, 
3; Wintour and Harper, 1993b, 4). 
 
In fact, directly comparing the two Labour surveys, as Minkin attempts to do, is extremely 
difficult. In neither study is the raw data straightforward. The 1993 questionnaire (in the 
review group’s final report) mapped out options for future parliamentary selections. In 
offering five, it was more complex than that of 1990. On the basis of its results, OMOV got 
nearly twice as much support as any other proposal. Levy plus, a form of OMOV, got 
another 15 per cent. By contrast, the 1990 survey had asked two broad questions alongside 
each other: whether the party should retain the electoral college and whether it should 
move to OMOV. So, in theory, a respondent could, confusingly, vote yes to both. The 
calculation of percentage responses published in this survey is not clear from the raw data. 
The NEC gives, as Minkin notes, a figure of 87 per cent of CLPs favouring OMOV. In fact the 
number of CLPs favouring OMOV (218) out of total number responding (348 – but this 
includes some branches) is much lower at 63 per cent because nearly a third did not state a 
view. The proportion of those stating a view is higher than the published figure, at around 
90 per cent. Moreover, these figures are then complicated by additional returns for both 
surveys published alongside the CLP results from smaller organisational units in the form of 
branches. Weighting these to try and reach the exact response would be an arbitrary 
business in terms of the precise differences in size between the two units and, in reality, 
each form probably represents the views of relatively few Labour activists. On top of this, a 
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number of respondents in 1993 filled out a further sixth option with specific, uncoded 
answers. Factoring them into the five options as best one can, we get a total of 643 
responses in 1993. Of these, 47 per cent are for OMOV, 20 per cent for the electoral college 
and 19 per cent for levy plus. Doing the same process for the 1990 survey, we get 88 per 
cent of units expressing a view supporting OMOV and 19 per cent endorsing the electoral 
college (the two question arrangement meaning they do not sum to 100 per cent). 
 
Interestingly, the comprehensive Sheffield survey from 1990 did not ask a direct question of 
OMOV, enquiring rather whether members felt that CLPs should have exclusive control of 
parliamentary selection. Over 60 per cent said yes (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, 239). In a poll 
of 4,000 people organised by Mori for the AEEU, 30 per cent of trade unionists said that 
OMOV would make them more likely to vote Labour (Bates, 1993a, 2). The same poll 
indicated that 26 per cent of Labour supporting affiliated members wanted unions to have a 
say in selecting parliamentary candidates. Regarding precise options, 47 per cent wanted 
OMOV for party members and 34 per cent OMOV including levy plus arrangement. Only 9 
per cent wanted the existing arrangement (Kellner, 1993).  
 
While support for OMOV in the early 1990s appears to have more momentum than Minkin 
indicates, quite what role such data played in Labour’s internal debates is less certain. Other 
than reporting the statistics (often tucked away in reports), the party made little use of it. 
Different positions were reported in the press, but to little effect. Writing in The Guardian, 
John Edmonds declared that OMOV would be lucky to receive the support of one half of the 
CLPs (Edmonds, 1993a, 18). In the event, two journalists estimated that 60 per cent of CLP 
delegates had voted in favour (Wintour and Harper, 1993, 1). 
 
Trade union financial contributions to Labour 
One claim that Minkin makes at some length in The Blair Supremacy is that the unions did 
not apply any financial pressure on Labour during the review group debate. He made the 
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same argument at some length in the early 1990s (Minkin, 1993a, see also Minkin, 1991, 
626-627), complaining to The Sunday Times, ‘To my knowledge, there is no evidence since 
1945 of any policy, reform of constitutional rules or internal election within the Labour party 
which has been secured by threats or fear of financial withdrawal, or the reduction of 
contributions, by the unions’ (Minkin, 1993b) Sunday Times, 27 June 1993). Minkin’s 
criterion, however, is a weak one. He equates the absence of a ‘no pay no say’ campaign 
with a lack of union pressure on Labour. Influence is measured in a very direct and overt 
fashion. Financial pressure be applied by the trade unions (or other bodies) in a much more 
indirect, subtle, and unspoken manner. There is an inconsistency here between Minkin’s 
analysis of the unions on this issue and his assessment of Labour modernisers such as Tony 
Blair. Minkin is adamant that the modernisers, despite any public protestations to the 
contrary, wanted to break the link between Labour and the unions. His suggestion is that 
there was a signal from them, in effect a private view, that this was the case (Minkin, 2014, 
83). But, looking at the public debate, there are remarkably few demands for an end to the 
trade union link. Blair was categoric that, far from ending the relationship, he wanted to 
reform and modernise it. In a Tribune interview in January 1993, he stated that he opposed 
divorce and simply wanted to introduce OMOV alongside a reform of the block vote: ‘I think 
it is extremely important that Labour should not sever its relations with the trade unions. 
What I do believe, however, is that we should make the democracy of our party as real as is 
possible’ (Anderson, 1992, 6). He repeated the denial on other occasions (see, for example, 
Blair, 1993, 22). Giles Radice, a Labour MP, told the GMB congress in 1993 that he knew of 
no MP who wanted to break the link (GMB, 1993, 312). Minkin may well be correct in 
suggesting that, despite protestations to the contrary, modernisers wanted such drastic 
reforms that the link would effectively be broken. Such proposals were not aired in public in 
a sustained fashion but part of an unspoken agenda. 
 
The same analysis can be applied to the trade unions and the question of financial influence. 
Union pressure might be part of a similar unspoken agenda. On the face of it, the suggestion 
of a ‘no say no pay’ campaign was, as Minkin argues, an anomaly, the result of one 
unfortunate briefing from early June 1992. Tom Sawyer had spoken out in response to 
unattributed briefings from modernisers: ‘I felt that we had to say something’ (Sawyer, 
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1992d). It was picked up and widely discussed in the media (see Harper, 1992, 2). A quick 
search though newspaper articles confirms the paucity of references to the issue. 
Interestingly, however, in December 1992, a Tribune journalist used the phrase to describe 
the positions of the GMB and the TGWU, among other unions: ‘no say no pay is their 
bottom line’ (Osler, 1992b, 3). A delegate to the TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference at 
Bournemouth, Dave Quayle, also used it in debate, complaining about the Labour leadership 
(TGWU Record, 1993, 12). But manifestly the phrase was used sparingly. 
 
Whether the trade unions applied no financial pressure to the Labour party, however, is 
another matter. At various stages throughout the debate financial matters were raised. In 
the Tribune article with which he launched the idea of a review, Sawyer was 
straightforward: ‘union members will not continue to pay money to the party without 
proper representation of their views’ (Sawyer, 1992a, 1), an indication, when coupled with 
his clumsy briefing in June, that financial issues were of some relevance. One of the 
straplines for the Tribune piece stated, ‘The party cannot survive financially without trade 
union support’. An unsigned memo in the Labour archive from this period is equally blunt, 
arguing before turning to the Sawyer initiative: ‘From discussions on finance, it is clear that 
the unions are deeply unhappy with the way this debate has been launched… they are 
prepared no longer to give wholehearted support to the party until we have achieved some 
resolution of these issues’ (‘Labour Party/Trade Union relations’, no date). In the summer of 
1992, at a joint Tribune Labour Coordinating Committee conference, Margaret Prosser 
argued that ‘the party could not survive without the financial contributions of the unions. 
They are not going to continue unless they have some element of influence’ (Tribune, 
1992d, 3). When he called for the abolition of the block vote, Chris Mullin raised finance: 
‘There are those who say that if the trade unions were to lose control of the Labour Party 
they should reduce their contributions to party funds accordingly’ (Mullin, 1992,4). In 
December 1992, as the TGWU cut the number it affiliated to Labour and so its financial 
contribution, Tribune described the decision as ‘a rap on the knuckles’ for the party (Osler, 
1992c, 2). The article quoted one TGWU executive as saying that the union was not getting 
good value for money and claimed that the TGWU had noted that the decision was political 
(and not a reflection of its own financial situation). Subsequently, the same journalist 
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quoted Bill Morris as suggesting that the TGWU would have to consider its position vis a vis 
Labour: ‘what is the purpose in affiliating to a party if you are denied the right to have a say 
in who leads it and in who represents it’ (Osler, 1993f, 5). Picking up on the Tribune piece, 
Patrick Wintour suggested Morris’ words represented a straightforward threat, headlining 
his report, ‘TGWU warns it may quit Labour’, (Wintour, 1993b, 4). Morris insisted the cut in 
affiliation was not political motivated and complained about The Guardian taking the 
quotation out of context (Morris, 1993a, 23). Elsewhere he was adamant that the reduction 
did not reflect ‘political jockeying’ surrounding the review group (Milne’s words; Milne, 
1992, 9). Milne noted that some would regard the decision ‘as a vote of no confidence in the 
party’.  
 
In Tribune, Edmonds took a similar line to Morris, arguing that levy payers resented being 
pushed out of Labour: ‘they pay into the party’ (Edmonds, 1993b, 12). Subsequently, he 
repeated the point: ‘The current disagreement is not about the block vote but about 
whether trade union members who sustain the party by paying political levies should be 
denied a vote and cut out altogether’ (Edmonds, 1993c, 12). He refused to accept trade 
unionists should not be involved in candidate selection: ‘not just wrong in itself but symbolic 
of an attitude which asks so much from the unions and gives back so little in return.’ During 
debate at the GMB congress in June 1993, one speaker was blunt: ‘if the Labour party want 
our money, then we want some influence and if they do not want to represent the views of 
our members, they can do without our money’ (GMB, 1993, 315). W. Hughes continued 
‘There is nobody can tell me that the big national companies who pour money into the Tory 
fund do not have a say in their policy’, continuing, ‘They need us more than we need them’ 
(GMB, 1993, 316). Bill Morris told the GMB publication, Direct: ‘Whether Labour could 
survive without union funds is a matter those making the policy must answer. I certainly 
don’t lose any sleep over it’ (Richards, 1992, 12). Speaking at a fringe meeting at the 1993 
conference, Morris was quoted: ‘I have a responsibility to get some value for my members’ 
contribution and I cannot accept that people who make a conscious effort to pay the 
political levy should no say’ (Bates, 1993b, 6).  
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Trade union restraint during the debate 
Restraint is a central explanatory variable for Minkin in explaining the conduct of senior 
trade union figures. He suggests that participants were ‘astonished’ at the depth of 
argument over the link during 1992-1993 as the notion of restraint was severely tested. It is 
arguable, however, just how restrained trade unionists were. In June 1993 at the GMB 
congress, John Edmonds led direct criticism of the Labour leadership: writing in Tribune, 
Dave Osler described it as ‘a barrage of fraternal back-stabbing quite reminiscent of times 
gone by’ (Osler, 1993l, 3). The Guardian referred to ‘a floodgate of bitterness over a wide 
range of issues’ (Milne, White and Harper, 1993, 1). Edmonds told GMB delegates that the 
dispute was ‘moving into a dangerous area’ (quoted by Milne and White, 1993, 1). These 
journalists concluded Labour-union relations to be at their most bitter since the Winter of 
Discontent in 1979. For BBC’s On The Record, Jonathan Dimbleby stated that Edmonds 
‘could hardly be less helpful to John Smith’, offering a ‘fierce critique’ (BBC, 1993, 1). 
Edmonds’ speech to the GMB complained about attacks on the unions which had supported 
Labour ‘through thick and thin (and recently there has been quite a lot of thin)’. He told 
delegates that such behaviour was ‘appalling’, finishing, ‘We support the party, we pay for 
the party and we have a right to democracy in the party because, never forget, it is our 
party, too’ (GMB, 1993, 300 and 303; Direct, 1993a, 6). Writing in Tribune, Edmonds stated, 
‘in practice, OMOV means denying trade union levy-payers any say in the selection of 
Labour party candidates and the election of the Labour party leader… Fewer people will be 
consulted and fewer people will vote’ (Edmonds, 1993b, 12). After an angry debate, the 
GMB voted to maintain the electoral college for parliamentary selections until a registered 
supporters scheme was established. It also passed a motion that ‘the Labour party are not 
playing their part as the main opposition party, representing the working class’ (GMB, 1993, 
288; see also Direct, 1993a and b). Tom Burlison complained that OMOV supporters had 
joined the review group determined that there was no other possible solution: ‘it’s 
arrogance and inflexibility that has led to where we are today and that’s on the brink of a 
crisis’ (Direct, 1993b, 7). 
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Bill Morris complained to Tribune in the summer of 1993 that the OMOV case was 
‘fraudulently presented’. He continued, ‘Let me tell you what the real debate is: it’s the 
exclusion of trade unionists from the decision making forums of the party’ (Osler, 1993f, 5). 
He rejected any reduction in the constitutional rights of union members: ‘I don’t see how 
you can compromise on democracy’. Morris was forthright, ‘we’re not chained to the 
Labour party’. At the July 1993 TGWU conference, the most he offered, by way of 
compromise, was a code of conduct to guide union behaviour (Osler, 1993k, 3). He insisted, 
‘We shall not be moved out of any of these electoral colleges’, (T & G Record, 1993a, 12).  
Even after Smith had won over the NEC and the working party, Morris persisted, 
complaining that OMOV restricted the democratic rights of union members (Morris, 1993b, 
8). Continuing, he refused to acknowledge any problem with the kind of existing collective 
model that underpinned Labour: ‘The TGWU needs no lectures on democracy from the 
college of spin-doctors’ (see also Morris, 1993c, 3). At the Labour conference, both Edmonds 
and Morris spoke in the debate; both opposed Smith. 
 
The final report of the review group noted that the debate had been ‘deeply divisive and, at 
times, bitter’ (LPTULRG, 1993b, 11). The extent and character of that argument challenges 
Minkin’s notion of restraint as being a significant factor in relations between Labour and the 
unions. It contests the emphases he puts upon self-control and upon a union role as ballast 
within the party, portraying relations as more conflictual and disputed. Moreover, it is 
striking that many of the reports quoted above are to be found not just in the broadsheet 
press but in Tribune and in union journals – sources broadly sympathetic to the movement.  
 
What was at stake? 
The above discussion suggests that, at times, the debate during 1992-93 over Labour’s links 
with the trade unions was a bitter and discordant one. At the same time, however, on 
occasion there did not appear to be much dividing the positions adopted by some of 
protagonists. Patrick Wintour argued that at one point there was a hair-splitting 50 pence 
per member separating the two sides, that is between a levy plus based register and OMOV 
 28 
 
(he suggested it would require 50p to top up an MSF member’s levy into membership on 
the basis of the Smith proposal: Wintour, 1993a, 22). Tribune described the row as a 
‘senseless internal bust-up’ (Tribune, 1993c, 2). It concluded: ‘The reality is that 
parliamentary reselections and leadership elections are not particularly crucial in defining 
the relationship between Labour and the unions… even simple OMOV… would make only 
the smallest of changes to the nature of the party union link.’ The newspaper later noted 
‘that the argument over OMOV has festered for long has owed much to the strained 
relations between sections of the Labour party and the trade unions (Tribune, 1993d, 2). 
 
The depth of disagreement and the rancour over potentially minor issues reinforces the 
notion that at times the argument was a proxy for more fundamental disagreement about 
the structure of the party. For Labour’s modernisers, the reforms may well have marked an 
attempt to recast the party’s constitution in a fundamental fashion (as Minkin suggests). For 
many senior trade unionists, the reforms were about scapegoating organised labour for the 
April 1992 general election defeat. Their position marked an attempt to retain as much of a 
role as possible across a range of the party’s institutions. Trade unions were also critical of 
Gordon Brown’s initiative as shadow chancellor to reorient the party’s economic strategy: as 
one journalist put it, ‘the complaints go far beyond the union link’ (see, Milne, 1993b, 2). In 
September 1993, John Edmonds complained about being held responsible for electoral 
reversal: ‘we were still blamed for losing the election despite any significant evidence that 
the union link was the cause’ (Edmonds, 1993c, 12). For Bill, Morris, the attack on unions 
was ‘a rather lazy search for new scapegoats’ (Tribune, 1993e, 3; T & G Record, 1993b, 5). 
He protested about ‘the salami-style removal of the unions from the Labour party, slice by 
slice’ (Morris, 1993b, 8) 
 
The debate about Labour’s electoral strategy and the orientation of the party was, however, 
not the only issue to have shaped the context within which the 1992-93 debate took place. 
At the time, discussions were underway between the TGWU and the GMB concerning a 
possible merger of the two unions. In the summer of 1993, both the GMB and the TGWU 
conferences voted in favour of negotiations (Osler, 1993m, 3; Labour Research, 1993, 7-9; 
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Direct, 1993c, 8; and T & G Record, 1993c, 14). Minkin does not discuss the possible merger 
but critics of John Edmonds, in particular, argued that his shifting trajectory, moving from 
support for OMOV to hostility toward it, was shaped by the merger and by a desire to lead 
the new body. They asserted that he may have wanted to offer a position more likely to be 
acceptable to the TGWU membership. Bill Jordan, president of the AEEU accused Edmonds 
of making a leadership bid for the new union, a claim that Edmonds rejected (Harper, 
1993b, 6). Two commentators suggested that Edmonds had a ‘hidden agenda’ while, earlier 
in the summer, The Guardian reported a colleague of John Smith as saying, ‘It’s all part of 
the GMB bargaining game’ (see respectively Clement and MacIntyre, 1993, 6; and Milne, 
White and Harper, 1993, 1). In his notes of a meeting with Neil Kinnock, Hugo Young wrote, 
‘Edmonds is totally preoccupied with becoming book of the new G and T union. This is the 
intellectual dishonesty of his new position on OMOV’ (Young, 2008, 387).   
 
Conclusions 
Lewis Minkin’s The Blair Supremacy offers many important insights into the 1992-1993 
Labour party trade unions links review group. Rightly, it restores this episode as a significant 
one in the development of Labour politics over the last few decades. It should be recognised 
that significant reforms were discussed and assessed before the advent of New Labour 
under Tony Blair’s leadership in 1994. It is clear that the reforms agreed in 1993 did not 
represent the kind of clear victory for modernisation that many press reports suggested to 
be the case. In this article, however, I have offered a different interpretation of the working 
party and of labour politics more generally. While noting the strength of Minkin’s analysis, I 
conclude that, in the aftermath of the 1992 general election defeat, there was considerable 
dissatisfaction across the party concerning its institutional structure and, accordingly, there 
was substantial pressure for constitutional change. In this regard, support for OMOV 
remained strong during the early 1990s while serious concerns were raised about the about 
the operation of block vote. Senior trade unionists remained extremely reluctant to concede 
a reduced role in such areas as parliamentary selection and the electoral college to elect the 
leader, despite the many criticisms that were made of existing arrangements or of other 
proposals that might sustain the involvement of organised labour. Whatever support was 
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offered by some trade unions for OMOV during the 1980s, much of it appeared to have 
been heavily qualified during the arguments of 1992-1993. Dianne Hayter’s account of 
internal party politics in the 1980s is persuasive but, broadly, such support for reforms was 
not sustained into the early 1990s (as characterised by John Edmonds’ shift on the issue of 
OMOV). (Of course, different unions took varied positions on these issues: the AEEU 
continued to push heavily for reform.) 
 
Minkin asserts that the acceptance by trade unionists of a reduced share of conference 
votes is evidence of an acknowledgement of the necessity of reforms. But, of course, as 
union votes became more concentrated through mergers and a decline in the number of 
affiliates, a fifty per cent share meant that a few unions would still be able to sustain 
considerable influence over the party against the mass of dispersed votes held by CLP 
delegates. Furthermore, I conclude that that financial issues were part of the wider debate 
and that this was a bitter debate in which there is little evidence of a norm of restraint. In 
many ways, the depth of the row and the failure of participants to compromise indicates 
that wider issues were at stake, concerning the general orientation of Labour politics in the 
United Kingdom. It is striking, moreover, that ample evidence for my claims about the 
antagonistic state of Labour politics during the early 1990s is to be found not only in the 
broadsheet press but in Tribune, a newspaper broadly aligned to the party as well as in the 
archival papers of the review group. 
 
A last point concerns the substance of the settlement reached. On paper the reforms looked 
more significant than the observations offered by many academics quoted in the 
introduction above. Did the outcome of the review’s proceedings represent, as Lewis Minkin 
had hoped, some sort of fundamentally recast arrangement between Labour and its 
affiliated unions? Had, as David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh suggest, the power of the 
unions within the party been broken? I am not persuaded either that the 1993 conference 
decisions marked a new, lasting settlement or that Labour’s affiliates had been marginalised 
in some sort of permanent, acquiescent fashion. Space precludes more than a few 
observations here. But I believe the comments I offer are consistent with my analysis of the 
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review group’s discussions and of antagonistic relations between the party and its affiliated 
unions. At the time of the review group, Tony Manwaring argued, ‘The test of this 
settlement will be judged – not by what it looks like on paper – but by whether the 
relationship flourishes on the ground, and whether it assists both partners in meeting the 
practical demands placed upon them’ (Manwaring, 1992). The protocol that he offered was 
pitched at a very general level, revolving around generalised notions of respect and support. 
It offered little by way of specificities as to what the detail of the party-union link might look 
like. Over the next two decades the specific institutional reforms of 1993 came under 
increasing strain. It was not the design of the measures that limited their impact but the 
manner in which they were implemented.  
 
The introduction of OMOV for parliamentary selections was, at first, relatively 
uncontroversial. But the notion of levy plus, the idea that trade unionists might be involved 
by paying a supplement to their affiliation fee, never really developed to the extent that few 
of them went on to join the party under the reduced fee schemes. Bill Morris pointed out 
that an earlier version of levy plus had resulted in only 13,000 new trade union members 
over five years (T & G Record, 1993d, 11; see also Alderman and Carter, 1994, 334). In any 
case, the possibility of recruiting trade unionists was swiftly engulfed by a more general rise 
in Labour’s membership after Tony Blair became leader. From the start, some questioned 
whether levy plus was financially viable which may offer an explanation as to why it never 
really developed (that cut price membership was uneconomic) (Osler, 1993n, 3; see also 
Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013a, 13). Of course, Labour’s membership fell 
dramatically between 1997 and 2010. In such circumstances, when the possibility of trade 
unionists joining the party en masse was raised once again, debate about the most 
appropriate means by which to select parliamentary candidates also re-emerged. Most 
obviously, in Falkirk in 2012, the role of trade union members and the question of whether 
Unite the Union, the successor to the TGWU, had adopted a deliberate strategy to shape 
selections became the subject of much debate. In turn, the controversy surrounding Falkirk 
led in part to the Collins review of Labour’ internal structure which proposed the dramatic 
reform that affiliated members should make a specific individual decision to opt in (Collins, 
2014) 
 32 
 
 
It is also not clear whether the 1993 reform of the electoral college to elect the leader 
through the introduction of OMOV was as significant as its proposers and scholars claimed 
to be the case. On a number of occasions, in other electoral colleges to choose a leader of 
the party in the Welsh Assembly and a candidate to be London mayor, New Labour resorted 
to union block votes in place of OMOV. By 2010, senior trade union figures had developed 
strategies by which to shape internal elections within the party, even with OMOV in place. 
They coordinated their nominations, restricted candidates’ access to their members when 
campaigning, and distributed ballot slips in the same packaging as partisan material. 
Arguably, such interventions allowed trade unions once again to shape the workings of the 
electoral college (for an account of Ed Miliband’s election as Labour leader in 2010 along 
these lines see Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011; and Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 
2013b). Again, the failure of the electoral college to operate smoothly became the subject 
of discussion in the Collins Review which proposed the introduction of a single electorate to 
choose the leader based on members, individual affiliates who had opted in and registered 
supporters. In 2015, following the abolition of the electoral college, Jeremy Corbyn was 
elected party leader in a contest in which the trade unions had a much more limited role 
(Wickham-Jones, 2015). The proposals of 1993 regarding parliamentary selection and the 
election of the party leader had not proved durable. 
 
For modernisers within Labour, the main lesson drawn from the review group appears to 
have been the importance of avoiding formal discussions about the party’s existing 
structures. They became less interested in reforms to the party’s institutional arrangements 
– in effect distancing themselves from the settlement and mapping out an agenda that was 
for the most part uncompromising in rejecting union demands. Indeed, Minkin’s text makes 
apparent the interventions by which the Blair leadership and others around simply sought 
to bypass those institutions altogether (Minkin, 2014; see also McIlroy, 1998; and McIlroy, 
2010). A variety of devices were used to marginalise opponents and secure desired 
outcomes. For trade union leaders, the settlement did not prevent them from asserting a 
role in subsequent leadership elections or adopting an antagonistic posture in more general 
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terms. The reduction of the union vote to a 50 per cent share at the party conference did 
little to reduce their capacity to shape formal decisions but for the most part modernisers 
simply reduced the formal role of the conference and ignored the few decisions that went 
against them.  
 
For all the discussion about its possible abolition during the discussions of the review group, 
de facto the block vote remained. Early in the reform process, Patrick Wintour had 
anticipated that unions would split votes at conference to reflect the internal division 
amongst their delegation (Wintour, 1992b, 21). In practice, it never happened. Although 
individual slips were issued to delegates, trade unions cast their votes as a single entity. A 
disappointed Guardian leader noted that the change would be ‘cosmetic, with each union 
voting as one’ (The Guardian, 1992, 18). Morris was adamant that delegates would be 
mandated, and that the TGWU vote would not be split between individuals: the union 
would ‘continue to expect its delegates to represent the union and its policies’ (Morris, 
1993d, 11). The block vote was retained some internal elections within Labour – for the post 
of treasurer and for trade union representatives on the NEC. 
 
This discussion raises a question mark about how successful was John Smith’s brief tenure 
as Labour leader between 1992 and 1994. To be sure, upon his unexpected death, the 
OMOV reform agreed at the 1993 conference was highlighted as ‘his most important 
success’ (Pimlott, 1994, 146). The analysis offered here suggests that the reform was neither 
agreed in its design nor straightforward in its implementation. The 1993 reforms proved to 
be neither an uncontested arrangement accepted by participants in Labour politics nor a 
durable settlement that persisted in shaping the party’s organisation. Much remained 
unresolved about Labour’s institutional structure. Important changes in Labour’s relations 
with its affiliates continued to take place after 1993: for example, within a few years, Tony 
Blair reworked the nature of trade union sponsorship of Labour MPs. Within two decades, 
the Collins review reopened an intense and conflictual discussion about the nature of the 
party’s relations with its affiliated unions, a debate that persists to this day without any sign 
of resolution. 
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Abbreviations 
AEEU   Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union  
AWS   All Women Shortlist 
COHSE  Confederation of Health Service Employees 
CLP   Constituency Labour Party 
LPA  Labour Party Archive,  
LPACR   Labour Party Annual Conference  
LPTULRG  Labour Party trade union links review group 
MSF   Manufacturing, Science and Technology 
NCU   National Communications Union 
NEC   National Executive Committee 
NUPE   National Union of Public Employees 
OMOV  One Member One Vote 
PLP   Parliamentary Labour Party 
RMT  National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers  
TGWU  Transport and General Workers’ Union 
UCW  Union of Communication Workers 
USDAW Union of Shop Distributive and Allied Workers 
 
Bibliographical note: Unless otherwise stated, the papers of the review group are to be found under 
LP TU Links Review Group at the Labour Party Archive (LPA), People’s History Museum, Manchester. 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
Bibliography 
Alderman, K. and N. Carter (1994), ‘The Labour Party and the trade unions: loosening the 
ties’, Parliamentary Affairs, 47, 3, 321-37. 
Anderson, P. (1992), ‘Boy wonder’, Tribune, 29 January, 6. 
Bates, S. (1993a), ‘ “Divided” Labour not focused on elections’, The Guardian, 13 September, 
2. 
Bates, S. (1993b), ‘Morris may host rival conference’, The Guardian, 30 September, 6. 
BBC, (1993), ‘On The Record’, transcript, 6 June. 
Bevins, A. and A. McSmith (1993), ‘One member… one victory’, The Observer, 3 October, 6  
Blair, T. (1993), ‘Unblocking Labour’, The Guardian, 9 June, 22. 
Butler, D. and D. Kavanagh, (1997) The British General Election of 1997 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave). 
Branch Officials’ Bulletin UCW, (1993), Press release, 31: 22, 11 June, para 501. 
Christopher, C. A., (1992), letter to Larry Whitty, 6 November, LPA. 
Clement, B. and D. MacIntyre (1993), ‘GMB leader’s new spots anger loyalists’, The 
Independent, 28 September, 6. 
Clement, B. and P. Wynn Davies (1993), ‘The Labour party in Brighton’, The Independent, 30 
September, 6. 
Collins, R. (2014), The Collins Review into Labour Party Reform (London, Labour party). 
Cook, R. (1992), ‘Why not put it to the vote?’, Tribune, 5. 
Daniels, G. and J. McIlroy (eds.) (2010), Trade Unions in a Neoliberal World (London: 
Routledge). 
Dewdney, K. (1992), ‘Who does run Labour?’, Fabian Review, 104: 4, July, 4. 
Direct, (1993a), ‘It’s our party, too’, no author, Direct, July/August, 9, 6-7. 
Direct (1993b), ‘Go for it’, no author, Direct, July/August, 9, 5. 
Direct (1993c ), ‘Softly, softly on merger’, no author, Direct, July/August, 9, 8.  
Edmonds, J. (1993a), ‘The cross John Smith has to bear’, The Guardian, 14 July, 18. 
Edmonds, J. (1993b), ‘OMOV means less democracy, Tribune, 4 June, 12. 
Edmonds, J. (1993c), ‘Opinion has swung in favour of unions’, Tribune, 17 September, 12. 
Foss, R. (1992), ‘Labour finally opts for one member, one vote’, Tribune, 29 May, 3. 
 36 
 
GMB, (1993), Report of Congress, Portsmouth (London, GMB). 
Goodman, G. (1993), ‘Outpaced by events’, Tribune, 3 September, 5. 
Gould, P. (2011), The Unfinished Revolution (London, Abacus). 
Grice, A. and M. Prescott (1993), ‘Major’s little local difficulty’, The Sunday Times, 13 June. 
Guardian, The (1992), ‘Dangerous compromise’, leader, The Guardian, 30 November, 18. 
Hagerty, B. (1993), ‘Smith scrapes through in key vote on OMOV’, Tribune, 1 October, 1. 
Harper, K. (1992), ‘NUPE campaign warns Labour to keep unions’ say in party’, The 
Guardian, 2 June. 
Harper, K. (1993a), ‘Union sinks Labour link changes’, The Guardian, 12 June, 4. 
Harper, K. (1993b), ‘Union row as Smith bid fades’, The Guardian, 28 September, 6. 
Harper, K. and M. White (1993), ‘Tide turns in favour of Smith’, The Guardian, 27 
September, 1. 
Hayter, D. (2005), Fightback! Labour’s traditional right in the 1970s and 1980s (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press). 
Jobson, R. and M. Wickham-Jones (2011), ‘Reinventing the block vote? Trade unions and the 
2010 Labour party leadership election’, British Politics, 6, 3, 317-344. 
Kellner, P. (1993), ‘Militants and monsters no more as unions adjust to new realities’, The 
Sunday Times, 12 September. 
Kettle, M. (1993), ‘Why Prescott’s peroration was just the gloss’, The Guardian, 2 October, 
21. 
Kinnock, N. (1992), ‘Memorandum on selection and reselection’, May, LPA. 
‘Labour Party/Trade Union relations’, (no date), memorandum, no author, no date, but 
1992, LPA. 
Labour Party/Trade Union Links Review Group, LPTULRG (1992a) Labour Party/Trade Union 
Links Interim Report (London, Labour party). 
Labour Party/Trade Union Links Review Group, LPTULRG (1992b), Trade Unions and the 
Labour Party Final Report (London, Labour party).  
Labour Research (1993), ‘Shaping up for a mega-union’, no author, Labour Research, 
September, 7-9. 
Macaskill, E. and J. Copley (1993), ‘Smith’s reform gamble pays off’, The Scotsman, 30 
September. 
MacIntyre, D. and B. Clement (1993), ‘Smith outguns union barons’, The Independent, 30 
September 1. 
 37 
 
McIlroy, J. (1998), ‘The Enduring Alliance? Trade Unions and the Making of New Labour 
1994-1997’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36, 4, 537-64. 
McIlroy, J. (2010), ‘The contentious alliance in the era of Blair and Brown’ in Daniels, Gary 
and McIlroy, John, eds., Trade Unions in a Neoliberal World, 165-201. 
Manwaring, T. (1992), ‘Protocol for the relationship between the Labour party and affiliated 
unions’, December, LPA. 
 ‘Memorandum on Selection and Reselection’ (no date), memorandum, no author, 
sometime in 1992, LPA. 
Milne, S. (1992), ‘TGWU to cut Labour affiliates by a third’, The Guardian, 4 December, 9. 
Milne, S. (1993a), ‘Row grows over Blair “plan” for deal with unions’, The Guardian, 9 June, 
6. 
Milne, S. (1993b), ‘Case against’, The Guardian, 7 June, 2.  
Milne, S. and M. White, Michael (1993), ‘Unions turn on Smith’s lethargy’, The Guardian, 7 
June, 1).  
Milne, S., M. White and K. Harper (1993), ‘Smith firm in face of union blow’, The Guardian, 8 
June, 1.   
Milne, S., P. Wintour and N. Knewstub (1993), ‘Union challenge to Labour’, The Guardian, 13 
May, 6. 
Minkin, L. (no date), ‘The Consultative Document’, paper, no date but around autumn 1992, 
LPA. 
Minkin, L. (1991), The Contentious Alliance (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press).   
Minkin, L. (1992a), ‘MSF for Labour meeting’, no date, paper, LPGS LP_TU Links Review, LPA.  
Minkin, L. (1992b), ‘A framework of working principles, themes and values’, paper, 5 
September, RG14, LPA.  
Minkin, L. (1992c), ‘The case for Labour’s links with the unions’, UCW, Branch Officials’ 
Bulletin, 38, 2 October. 
Minkin, L. (1992d), ‘Notes’, 17 June, memorandum, LPGS LP-TU Links Review, LPA. 
Minkin, L. (1992e), ‘Keep the links’, Direct, October, 5, 16.  
Minkin, L. (1992f), ‘Individual and collective responsibility a new balance’, paper, LPA. 
Minkin, L. (1992g), ‘Block voting at the party conference – an agenda of problems and 
possibilities’, RG33, LPA. 
Minkin, L. (1993a), ‘Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee Inquiry into the funding of 
political parties’, paper, Box Trade Unions for Labour, 1986-1994, LPA. 
 38 
 
Minkin, L. (1993b), letter, The Sunday Times, 27 June. 
Minkin, L. (2014), The Blair Supremacy (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
Morris, B. (1993a), letter, The Guardian, 1 July, 23. 
Morris, B. (1993b), ‘No lessons needed from the modernisers’, Tribune, 30 July, 8. 
Morris, B. (1993c), ‘A message from the General Secretary’, T&G Record, August, 3. 
Morris, B. (1993d), letter, Tribune, 29 October, 11. 
Mullin, C. (1992), ‘Is there life after the block vote?’, Tribune, 23 October, 4. 
NEC (1990), Selection of parliamentary Candidates (London, Labour party). 
‘Note on the levy payers participating in OMOV in reselections’ (no date), memorandum, 
Kinnock papers, box 595, Churchill College, University of Cambridge. 
Osler, D. (1992a), ‘Union links row intensifies, Tribune, 4 December 1992, 3. 
Osler, D. (1992b) ‘Union links report sets out new system’, Tribune, 11 December, 3. 
Osler, D. (1992c) ‘TGWU cuts Labour funding’, Tribune, 11 December, 2. 
Osler, D. (1993a) ‘Union links report returned for redraft’, Tribune, 22 January, 10. 
Osler, D. (1993b), ‘Union links group lays out options’, Tribune, 5 February, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993c), ‘Smith backs OMOV to choose candidates’, Tribune, 26 February, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993d), ‘Unions fight back in campaign to keep Labour link’, Tribune 21 May, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993e), ‘Leader accused of by passing discussion’, Tribune, 28 May, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993f), ‘The party’s over’, Tribune, 2 July, 5. 
Osler, D. (1993g), ‘Compromise on cards after union link votes’, Tribune, 4 June, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993h), ‘Union links row reaches new depths of bitterness’, Tribune, 11 June, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993i), ‘Smith scores tactical victory on OMOV’, Tribune, 23 July, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993j), ‘Smith charms OMOV doubters’, Tribune, 10 September, 1. 
Osler, D. (1993k), ‘Smith appeals to trade unionists as individuals’, Tribune, 9 July, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993l), ‘Union links row reaches new depths of bitterness’, Tribune, 11 June, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993m), ‘Smith appeals to trade unionists as individuals’, Tribune, 9 July, 3. 
Osler, D. (1993n), ‘Levy-plus membership at £3 could herald “bankruptcy for Labour’, 
Tribune, 30 July, 3. 
 39 
 
‘Parliamentary Selections and Party-Union Links’ (no date), memorandum, no author, no 
date, probably 1992, LPA. 
Pemberton, H. and M. Wickham-Jones (2013a), ‘Labour’s lost grassroots: the rise and fall of 
party membership’, British Politics, 8, 181-206. 
Pemberton, H. and M. Wickham-Jones (2013b), ‘Brothers all? The operation of the electoral 
college in the 2010 Labour leadership’, Parliamentary Affairs, 66, 4, 708-731. 
Pimlott, B. (1994), Frustrate their knavish tricks (London: Harper Collins). 
Prescott, J. (1993), ‘Levy plus is the answer’, Tribune, 11 June, 2. 
Prosser, M. (1993), note to Whitty, 18 December, LPA. 
Quinn, Thomas (2004), Modernising the Labour Party, Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Rentoul, John (1995) Tony Blair (London, Little Brown). 
‘Resume of progress’ (no date), memorandum, no date but 1992, LPA. 
RG33 (no date), ‘Parliamentary Selections and Party-Union Links’, no date, sometime in 
1992, LPA;  
RG42 (no date), ‘Registered Supporters’, memorandum, no author, sometime in autumn 
1992, LPA. 
RG49 (no date), ‘Party/Trade Union Links Outline Final Report’, no author, sometime in 
1992, LPA. 
Richards, John (1992), ‘Bill Morris Keeping the Faith’, Direct, June, issue 3, 10-12. 
Russell, Meg (2005), Building New Labour, Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
Sawyer, Tom, (1992a), ‘Don’t ditch the union link’, Tribune, 1 May, 1. 
Sawyer, Tom, (1992b), ‘letter to Larry Whitty’, 22 May, NEC papers, LPA. 
Sawyer, Tom, (1992c,) ‘Roots and resources’, Fabian Review, vol 104, no 4, July, 3-4. 
Sawyer, Tom (1992d), ‘letter to Larry Whitty’, 2 June, LPGS LP-TU Links Review, LPA. 
Sawyer, Tom (1993) ‘Levy-payers link-up’, 4 June, Tribune, 1. 
Seyd, Patrick and Whiteley, Paul (1992) Labour’s Grass Roots, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Sherman, Barrie, 1992 ‘Disaffilation is not divorce’, Tribune, 4 September 1. 
Short, Clare (1992) ‘If Smith Wins, Gould must be deputy’, Tribune, 24 April, 3. 
Smith, John, 1993, ‘Three key areas of change in electoral procedure’, The Scotsman, 30 
September.  
 40 
 
Spellar, John (1993), ‘Labour needs to adopt one member one vote now’, Tribune, 19 March, 
6. 
Stuart, Mark (2005), John Smith A Life (London: Politico’s). 
T & G Record (1993a) ‘Labour party advised not to cut itself off from unions’, no author, T & 
G Record, August, 12. 
T & G Record, (1993b), ‘Labour must keep link with unions’, no author, T & G Record, April,  
5). 
T & G Record (1993c), ‘GMB merger makes industrial sense’, no author, T & G Record, 
August, 14. 
T & G Record (1993d), ‘One movement, one voice- Bill’s call’, no author, T & G Record, 
October, 11). 
Timmns, Nicholas (1992), ‘Smith prepares to face union test on selection’, The Independent, 
10 June, 9. 
Tribune (1992a), ‘Labour and the unions’, Tribune, 18 December 1992, 2. 
Tribune (1992b), ‘Labour needs radical rethinking’, Tribune, 17 April, 2. 
Tribune, (1993c), ‘Ruling out abolition of the block vote is a mistake’, Tribune, 9 October, 2. 
Tribune, (1992d), ‘No consensus on union link’, Tribune, 3 July, 3. 
Tribune, (1993a), ‘Furniture union to join GMB’, Tribune 30 April, 1. 
Tribune, (1993b) ‘Poll shows majority against OMOV, Tribune, 2 July, 3.  
Tribune, (1993c) ‘Labour’s union row: what a load of rubbish!’, leader, Tribune, 11 June, 2. 
Tribune, (1993d) ‘A new deal for the trade unions from Labour’, leader, Tribune, 10 
September, 2. 
Tribune, (1993e), ‘News item’, Tribune, 26 March, 3. 
Tribune Group of MPs (1993), ‘Labour’s links with the trade unions’, RG65, LPA. 
Tribune reporter, (1992), ‘No divorce from unions’, Tribune, 9 October, 3. 
 ‘Union participation in selection’ (no date), handwritten notes, no author, no date, around 
1992 handwritten notes, 2). 
USDAW Today, (1993), 10; ‘One member, one vote turned down by ADM’, May/June, 10. 
Walker, Mark (1992) ‘The Relationship between political levy payer and the Labour party’, 
GS/32, November, LPA. 
Webb, Ben 1992, ‘A special relationship’ Tribune, 17 July, 4-5. 
 41 
 
Webb, Paul (1995) ‘Reforming the Labour Party-Trade Union Link: An Assessment’ in 
Broughton, David et al (eds.), British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1994, 1-14.  
Westlake, Martin (2001), Kinnock The Authorised Biography (London, Little Brown). 
Whitty, Larry (1992) ‘Labour Party/Trade Union relations’, GS:22\6\92, NEC papers, LPA. 
Whitty, Larry (1993) note to Tony Manwaring, 7 January, LPA. 
Wickham-Jones, Mark (2014), ‘Introducing OMOV: the Labour Party-Trade Union Review 
Group and the 1994 Leadership Contest’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 52: 1, 33-56. 
Wickham-Jones (2015), ‘Trade union members did not shape the Labour leadership result as 
much as in past elections’ blog, LSE British politics and policy, available at: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/trade-union-members-did-not-shape-the-labour-
leadership-result-as-much-as-in-past-elections/. 
Wickham-Jones, M (forthcoming), ‘Lewis Minkin’s Labour The developing party union 
relationship’, Political Studies Review. 
Williams, John (1992), letter to Prosser, 4 December, LPA. 
Wintour, Patrick (1992a) ‘GMB split on Labour vote procedure’, The Guardian, 30 
November, 2. 
Wintour, Patrick (1992b), ‘Mr Smith: Labour’s New Moralist’, The Guardian, 19 July 1992, 
21. 
Wintour, Patrick (1993a), ‘Half a quid pro quo is the unions’ solution’, The Guardian, 9 June, 
22. 
Wintour, Patrick (1993b), ‘TGWU warns it may quit Labour’, The Guardian, 30 June, 4. 
Wintour, Patrick and Harper, Keith (1993a), ‘Smith pulls off high-risk gamble’, The Guardian, 
30 September, 1.  
Wintour, Patrick and Harper, Keith (1993b), ‘Smith “firm on one-member-one-vote”’, The 
Guardian, 7 July, 4. 
Wintour, Patrick and Milne, Seumas (1992), ‘Labour leadership fight brings up consensus’ 
The Guardian, 21 April, 2. 
Young, Hugo, (1993), ‘Unchained but still bonded’, The Guardian, 30 September, 22. 
Young, Hugo (2008), The Hugo Young Papers, London, Allen Lane. 
 
 42 
 
1. The exact title of the review group varies in Labour documentation: it is first called Labour 
Party/trade union links review group, then a trade union links review group. The two 
published reports do not formally identity the group’s title and reverse the linkage. The 
interim report being Labour party/trade union links and the final one being Trade Unions 
and the Labour Party. I cite both here as Labour Party/trade union links review group 
abbreviated to LPTULRG , 1992a and b respectively). 
                                                          
